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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

CATEGORICAL PERCEPTION OF SPECIES IN INFANCY
Although there is a wealth of knowledge on categorization in infancy, there are
still many unanswered questions about the nature of category representation in infancy.
For example, it is yet unclear whether categories in infancy have well-defined boundaries
or what knowledge about species categories young infants have before entering the lab.
Using a morphing technique, we linearly altered the proportion of cat versus dog in
images and observed how infants reacted to contrasts between pairs of images that either
did or did not cross over the categorical boundary. This was done while equating
between-category and within-category similarity. Results indicate that infants’ preexisting categories of cats and dogs are discrete and mutually exclusive. Experiment 2
found that inversion caused a disruption in processing by 6.5- but not 3.5- month-old
infants, indicating a developmental change in category representation. These findings
demonstrate a propensity to dichotomize early in life that could have implications for
social categorizations, such as race and gender. Furthermore, this work extends previous
knowledge of infant categorical perception by demonstrating a priori knowledge of
familiar species categories and the boundaries between them.
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Chapter One:
Introduction
Imagine you are confronted with a large, brown, hairy animal. What do you do?
Your reaction would most likely differ depending on how you categorize the new
stimulus. If you classify it as a bear, you may try to hide. If you classify it is a dog, you
may try to take it home with you. This is one, exceedingly oversimplified, example of
how categories are essential in everyday life. By knowing a novel object’s category
membership, an individual can automatically apply his or her previous knowledge of the
category without further investigation. The immediate availability of information is just
one illustration of how categories are beneficial for mental economy and rapid
responding. The human propensity to categorize is also an important factor impacting
many, if not all, forms of out-group bias. One example is racial bias, which is evident in
various contexts, ranging from teacher expectations of students (McKown & Weinstein,
2008) to police officers deciding whether or not to use deadly force (Cano, 2010).
Given the pervasive nature of categorization and its adaptive value in many
contexts, it is not surprising that the ability to classify objects develops early in life and
across widely varied domains (Madole & Oakes, 1999; Quinn & Eimas, 1986). For
example, 5-month-olds form categories representative of 3-dimensional objects (Mash &
Bornstein, 2012), and 10- and 3.5-month-olds form categories based on spatial
relationships regarding fit (inside/outside; Casasola & Cohen, 2002) and position
(above/below; Quinn, 1994), respectively. Evidence of categorization has also been
found with social stimuli, specifically human faces. Bornstein and Arterberry (2003)
found evidence for categorization of emotional facial expressions as early as 5 months of
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age. Furthermore, infants categorize human faces based on race by 9 months of age
(Anzures et al., 2010). The current study focused on species categories because, as will
be discussed below, they offer unique benefits as basic level categories that are both
biologically discrete and socially relevant.
Despite the fact that there is a wealth of knowledge on categorization in infancy,
there are still many unanswered questions about the nature of category representation in
infancy. For example, how do species categories in infancy, once formed, relate to one
another? Are they discrete and mutually exclusive, reflecting the state of the world, or is
there perceptual overlap? What knowledge about species categories do young infants
have before entering the lab? To answer these questions, we developed a spontaneous
visual preference procedure using morphed images. This allowed us to examine category
knowledge without training in the lab, control for perceptual differences between stimuli,
and test whether species categories in infancy have definite boundaries.
Species categories provide some unique benefits when studying categorization.
First they are biologically mutually exclusive, but they also have a good deal of
perceptual overlap. In essence, this means that for a category structure of a species to
reflect underlying biology it must be discrete. A single animal cannot be a member of
multiple species categories. Even hybrids of two species, such as mules, are not
considered to hold dual category membership. However, given the perceptual similarities
between certain species, such as cats and dogs, it is conceivable that infants’
representations of these species would be continuous rather than discrete. It is a tall order
to assume that infants have learned that part of being a cat is not being a dog, so the
boundaries between species may not be well-defined in infancy. Another advantage to
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studying biological categories is that they are socially relevant. Humans interact with a
great deal of plants and animals in their daily lives, thus accurate sensitivity to biological
kinds would be adaptive.
Studying species categories is additionally beneficial in that they are basic level
categories. One well-documented phenomenon in categorization research is the primacy
of categories at the basic level over superordinate or subordinate categories (i.e., pants
over clothing or dress pants). These categories are found to be the most quickly identified
by adults (Jolicoeur, Gluck, & Kosslyn, 1984; Murphy & Smith, 1982). Compared to
subordinate categories, basic level categories are also the more commonly used in
language (dog over boxer; Brown, 1958), as well as the most commonly used words by
adults when talking to children (Anglin, 1977; Callanan, 1985). This highlights the
importance of basic categories in cognition. They are thought to have an ideal balance of
within-group similarity and between-group differences (Rosch, Simpson, & Miller,
1976). This means that members of these categories are readily grouped together and
easily excluded from other categories.
One could argue that in the western culture, after humans, there are few to no
species infants are exposed to more than cats and dogs. Given that fact, it is not surprising
that infants have been found to categorize these species early in life. Quinn and Eimas
(1996) found that 4-month-old infants formed a category of cats that excluded dogs. It
should be noted, however, that the cited study used a familiarization-visual preference
procedure. Indeed, the vast majority of research on categorization in infancy has used a
familiarization procedure followed by a visual preference test. In this paradigm, infants
are familiarized to a number of exemplars from category A over many trials. Following
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this, the infants are tested for their preference between a novel exemplar of category A
and an exemplar of category B. A novelty preference for the stimulus from category B is
interpreted as evidence of categorization. While this procedure has been extremely useful
in determining what types of categories infants are capable of forming, it is unable to
answer questions about pre-existing categories and the relationships between them. To
begin addressing these constraints, we developed a new paradigm for testing categorical
perception.
Critically, the new procedure sheds light on the relationships between categories
in infancy. When considering category borders, two options immediately come to mind.
The categories could be discrete, as would be conceptualized by a Venn diagram with no
overlap, meaning that the categories are mutually exclusive. It is also possible that there
is an area of overlap, i.e., the middle section of a Venn diagram with overlapping circles.
This section can be thought of as an area of dual or ambiguous category membership. By
determining whether infants are sensitive to a sharp boundary between categories, it is
possible to distinguish between these possibilities. If the categories are discrete and
mutually exclusive, one would expect differences in performance on comparisons that
cross the categorical boundary compared to those that do not. If the categories overlap,
however, one would not expect such differences.
Studies attempting to differentiate between discrete and continuous categorization
have been conducted in many areas of research, including language and color perception.
Hu and colleagues (2014) found that when color category membership is linearly
manipulated, adults’ response times are slower with comparisons that are within a
category (as defined by a word label) compared to those that cross the categorical
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boundary. Test stimuli were square patches of color, and adults’ same/different
judgments between two different shades of green took longer than contrasts between a
green and blue shade. This occurred in spite of the fact that the physical difference
between the two green shades was the same as the difference between the green and the
blue shade, meaning that the discrepancy in response times can be attributed to a salient,
discrete, category boundary. Similarly, evidence of categorical perception of hue was
found in 4-month-old infants using a dishabituation paradigm (Bornstein, Kessen, &
Weiskopf, 1977). Infants showed greater dishabituation to hues from novel categories
compared to the familiar category even when the differences in wavelength were equated.
This demonstrates discrete category structures early in life. Evidence of discrete category
boundaries in infancy could shed light on social issues surrounding false dichotomization.
Namely, if infants show a predisposition for dichotomizing categories (as adults do,
incorrectly, with race and gender), even when stimuli are altered continuously, it may be
possible to develop early interventions that promote more flexible and continuous social
category representations.
In the current study, we linearly altered the proportion of cat versus dog in images
and observed how infants reacted to contrasts between images that either did or did not
cross over the categorical species boundary. Specifically, we examined whether infants
looked longer at a pair of images from different categories than a pair from the same
category. The linear manipulation enabled us to equate visual differences in the two
contrast types. If infants exhibited an attentional bias to between-species contrasts
compared to within-species contrasts, it would be evidence of a salient categorical
boundary. Such a finding would suggest that infants treat species categories as discrete
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and mutually exclusive. Recall that in the habituation/visual preference paradigm
typically used in infant categorization studies, the critical test is based on a novelty
preference for an image from category B after being exposed to category A exemplars. It
is possible that the test image from category B is arbitrarily more novel than the test
image from category A. For example, it is likely that any cat will be perceptually more
dissimilar to a dog than two dogs are to each other. This means that infants could show a
novelty preference for the cat based on low-level similarity without being sensitive to the
discrepancies between categories. By using morphing techniques in this study we
removed this obstacle. Visual differences between image pairs that crossed the species
boundary or stayed within a single species were equated. Thus, any preferences observed
cannot be explained by differences in within-category versus between-category
similarity.
We were additionally interested in examining infants’ pre-existing category
knowledge. The habituation period in the habituation/visual preference procedure
discussed above could serve as a learning period for the infants (Quinn & Eimas, 1996).
We wanted to determine if infants formed discrete categories of cats and dogs without
priming or training in the laboratory. If so, it would indicate either that infants’ early
experience with these species is sufficient to form such categories, or there is something
about biological categories that predispose humans to group them systematically. To
examine this issue, a spontaneous preference procedure, with no familiarization, was used
in this study. While Quinn and Eimas (1996) documented species categories by 4 months
of age using the habituation/visual preference procedure discussed above, infants in that
study could have learned the category during familiarization. Thus, it is yet unclear
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whether infants have pre-existing categories for cats and dogs. Given that, we used a
spontaneous preference procedure to test 3.5- and 6.5-month-old infants in Experiment 1
with morphed, upright images of combinations of cats and dogs.
Additionally, Experiment 2 was conducted with inverted images to examine
possible effects of expertise. Disruptions in perception caused by inverting images are
typically explained by familiarity or expertise. For example, Yin (1969) demonstrated
that the impact of inverting stimuli on adults’ performance in discrimination tasks was
greater for human faces than analogous houses. As inverting images does not remove
low-level information, this effect is attributed to humans being expert processors of
upright human faces. An impaired ability to perceive discrete category boundaries in the
inverted condition, but not in the upright, would indicate category knowledge beyond
low-level perceptual features.
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Chapter Two:
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 assessed the sensitivity of 3.5- and 6.5-month-olds to the
categorical boundary between cats and dogs. This was done using a spontaneous visual
preference procedure to ensure that experience in the lab did not impact performance.
Infants were shown two images at a time that differed systematically in the proportion of
cat or dog. In one pair, the images spanned the 50% cat/dog category boundary
(40%Cat/60%Dog and 60%Cat/40%Dog), while in the other pair, both images were
within the same category (60%Cat/40%Dog and 80%Cat/20%Dog). If infants looked
longer at image pairs that differed in category membership than those that belonged to the
same category, in spite of the fact that the images’ compositional differences were equal
in magnitude in the two pairs, it would be evidence of a discrete categorical boundary.
Method
Participants. Sixteen 3.5-month-olds (mean age = 108.00 days, SD = 9.05; 8
female) and 16 6.5-month-olds (mean age = 193.50 days, SD = 7.75; 9 female)
successfully completed the study and were included in the final sample. Three additional
3.5-month-olds participated but their data were excluded due looking to the stimuli for
less than 20% of the duration of the study (n=1), equipment failure (n=1), or being an
outlier on the dependent measure (n=1, more than 1.5xIQR below the 25th quartile). Data
from three 6.5-month-olds were excluded for looking for less than 20% of the study
duration (n=1), failing to look on a test trial (n=1), or being an outlier on the dependent
measure (n=1). Participants in this study were recruited from birth announcements and
the local hospital, and were predominantly from middle-class, Caucasian families.
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Stimuli. Eight images of cats and eight images of dogs were used in this study.
Dog images were obtained through a Google Image search and cat images came from an
image bank (Zhang, Sun, & Tang, 2008). All images had predominantly solid coloring
and forward facing eyes. Using FantaMorph software, three types of images were created
with varying proportions of cat and dog characteristics.
The cat/dog percentages outlined in Table 1 were selected as they resulted in
equal changes in image composition from across-species to low-within species images
(between-category contrasts) and from low-within to high-within species images (withincategory contrasts). Thus, between-category similarity and within-category similarity
were equated.
Minor editing was done using Adobe Photoshop. Morphed images were cropped
to an oval (12.42 cm x 14.25 cm) to equate for differences in face shape, and a black and
white filter was applied to give the appearance of even coloring. Slight touch-ups were
made to reduce variability in image clarity and brightness. Any distracting blemishes or
shadows were removed.
Previous morphing studies have typically started with two images (e.g., pictures
of two different individuals, or the same individual displaying two different emotions)
when creating stimuli (e.g., Campanella, Chrysochoos, & Bruyer, 2001; Capozza,
Boccato, Andrighetto & Falvo, 2009; Walker & Tanaka, 2003). If one were to apply the
same process to the current research question and morph a single cat (“Fluffy”) with a
single dog (“Fido”), a potential confound is introduced. Specifically, the transition from
40% to 60% crosses the 50% species boundary (half cat/half dog), but also an individual
boundary at 50% between the identities of the animals used (half “Fluffy”/ half “Fido”).
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In other words, the between-species contrast crosses two boundaries (identity and
species) and the within-species contrast crosses none. Thus, if infants were to exhibit an
attentional bias toward the between-species contrast compared to the within-species
contrast, it would not be possible to ascertain whether this is due to crossing a boundary
between categories, identities, or both.
Given that there is no way to remove the identity boundary from the between
species contrast (one individual cannot be both a cat and a dog), an identity boundary was
added to the within-species contrast by using multiple exemplars of each species, see
Figure 1. That is, now both the within-species contrast and the between-species contrast
include an identity boundary, see Figure 2. Thus, differences in look duration to the
between-species versus within-species contrasts cannot be attributed to identity
boundaries, only to category boundaries. At the same time, the changes in image
composition between the stimuli were kept consistent in the two contrast types (see
Tables 2 and 3). The important thing to note is that the far right columns (detailing
changes in image composition) are identical in Tables 2 and 3. This ensured that any
preference for one pair over another was not a function of the dissimilarities between the
images in each pair, as the degree of differences was equated.
Apparatus and Procedure. During the study, infants were seated on their parent’s
lap in a darkened chamber, approximately 60 cm in front of a 58 cm computer monitor.
Parents wore opaque glasses to prevent them from seeing test images and potentially
biasing the infant’s looking patterns. Infants were tested on 4 trials, each 8 s long. A trial
consisted of two images displayed side by side on a grey background, see Figure 3. For
two test trials, the across image (e.g., 40% cat) and a low-within image (e.g., 60% cat)
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were paired. This is the between-species contrast. The remaining trials were withinspecies contrasts where a low-within image (e.g., 60% cat) was paired with the highwithin image (e.g., 80% cat). The left/right location of the low-within face on the first
trial, type of first trial (between-species contrast or within-species contrast), and majority
species condition (cat or dog) were counterbalanced across infants. For each infant, trial
type switched from trial 1 to trial 2, and the pattern reversed for trials 3 and 4. For
example, if an infant’s trial 1 was a between-species contrast, trial 2 would be a withinspecies contrast, trial 3 would be a within-species contrast, and trial 4 would be a
between-species contrast. Preceding every trial, an attention getter consisting of
alternating colorful shapes appeared on the screen to re-focus the infant’s attention to the
center of the screen. After the infant’s attention was centered on the screen, as judged via
live video feed, the experimenter pushed a key to present the pair of the stimuli for that
trial.
Data were collected by a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker. The eye-tracker’s cameras
record the reflection of an infrared light source on the cornea relative to the pupil from
both eyes at a frequency of 300 Hz. The average accuracy of this eye tracking is in the
range of .5 to 1 degree, which approximates to a .5-1 cm area on the screen with a
viewing distance of 60 cm. When both eyes cannot be measured (e.g., due to movement
or head position), data from the other eye were used to determine the gaze coordinates.
The eye-tracker compensates for robust head movements, which typically result in a
temporary accuracy error of approximately 1 degree and a 100 ms recovery time to full
tracking ability after movement offset.
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Before starting data collection, each infant’s eyes were calibrated using a 5-point
infant calibration procedure in which a 23.04 cm2 red and yellow rattle coupled with a
rhythmic sound was presented sequentially at five locations on the screen (i.e., the four
corners and the center). An experimenter controlled the calibration process with a key
press to advance to the next calibration point after the infant was judged (via a live video
feed) to be looking to the current calibration point. The calibration procedure was
repeated if calibration was not obtained for both eyes in more than one location. Eyetracker calibration and stimulus presentation were controlled by Tobii Studio 3.3.1
software (Tobii Technology AB; www.tobii.com). An I-VT fixation filter was used to
remove noise from the data.
Areas of interest (AOIs) were defined around each face included in the contrast,
as shown in Figure 3. Collectively, the AOIs encompassed 18.06% of the screen and a
horizontal and vertical visual angle of 20.20° and 12.46° respectively. Values were
obtained for total fixation duration (sum of all looks exceeding 60 ms while remaining
within a 0.5° radius) to both AOIs for each type of stimulus (between-species contrast,
within-species contrast). Similar criteria pertaining to fixation duration are often used in
infant eye-tracking studies (e.g., Hunnius, de Wit, Vrins, & von Hofsten, 2011;
Papageorgiou et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2015).
Results and Discussion
Prior to participating in the study, parents were asked to report on the presence of
cats and/or dogs in the home. Four 3.5-month-olds and eight 6.5-month-olds lived with
dogs only, two 3.5-month-olds and four 6.5-month-olds lived with a cat only, and two
3.5-month-olds and one 6.5-month-old lived with both a cat and a dog. Due to small
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sample sizes in each pet category and unbalanced distribution of these variables, we did
not analyze the effects of a pet in the home on performance.
The dependent measure was the proportion of fixation duration to the betweenspecies contrast trials. This was calculated by summing fixations to AOIs (each face in
the contrast, see Figure 3) during both between-species contrast trials and dividing this
number by fixations to all AOIs across all trials. An independent samples t-test indicated
no effect of age group, t(30) = 0.07, p = .948, d = 0.02. A one-sample t-test was
conducted comparing proportion fixation duration to the between-species contrast trials
(M = 53.69%, SE = 1.12) to chance (50%). Infants fixated proportionally longer to
between-species stimuli than chance, t(31) = 3.27, p = .003, d = 0.58. To ensure that 3.5month-olds’ performance was not being artificially inflated by being combined with the
older age group, data from each age group were also analyzed separately. Proportion
fixation duration to the between-species contrast trials differed significantly from chance
at both 3.5 months [M = 53.76, SE = 1.71; t(15) = 2.20, p = .044, d = 0.55] and at 6.5
months [M = 53.61, SE = 1.53; t(15) = 2.36, p = .032, d = 0.59]. Thus, both 3.5-montholds and 6.5-month-olds looked longer at stimuli during the between-species category
trials than during the within-species category trials, even though each type of contrast
was equated in the degree of differences between the stimuli. This indicates that infants’
pre-existing knowledge of cats and dogs includes a discrete category boundary even by
3.5 months of age.
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Table 2.1
Composition of the Stimuli used in Experiments 1 and 2
Image Type
Percent Species A Percent Species B

Overall Category of Image
(based on greater than 50% of
category)

Across Species

40

60

B

Low-Within Species

60

40

A

High-Within Species

80

20

A
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Table 2.2
Composition of high-within and low-within images presented on a within-species contrast
trial
High-Within Image
Low-Within Image
Compositional change
Dimension

(80%Cat/20%Dog*)

(60%Cat/40%Dog)

between images

Cat 1

40%

60%

20%

Cat 2

40%

0%

40%

Dog 1

10%

40%

30%

Dog 2

10%

0%

10%

*The values depicted represent a majority cat condition. Percentages were swapped for
majority dog conditions (i.e., 80%Dog/20%Cat).
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Table 2.3
Composition of low-within and across images presented on a between-species contrast
trial
Low-Within Image
Across Image
Compositional change
Dimension

(60%Cat/40%Dog*)

(40%Cat/60%Dog)

between images

Cat 1

0%

20%

20%

Cat 2

60%

20%

40%

Dog 1

0%

30%

30%

Dog 2

40%

30%

10%

*The values depicted represent a majority cat condition. Percentages were swapped for
majority dog conditions (i.e., 80%Dog/20%Cat).
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Figure 2.1 Rectangular images depict original images. Oval images depict morphed
stimuli that were presented to participants. Every image shown to the infants had a
different majority identity. This means that both types of contrast (across versus lowwithin and low-within versus high-within) crossed identity boundaries, but only one
contrast (across to low-within) crossed the species boundary.
Sample Across Image

Sample High-Within Image

Sample Low-Within Image

Sample Low-Within Image
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Figure 2.2 Double sided arrows denote boundaries crossed between images. Values
below arrows depict changes of each contributing exemplar between images in the
indicated direction.
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Figure 2.3. Sample stimuli shown to participants. Rectangles imposed on images depict
areas of interest (AOIs) used in data collection. These were not visible to infants during
test.
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Chapter Three:
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted identically to Experiment 1 except all images were
flipped vertically. Inversion conditions are commonly used in infant cognition studies to
examine the role of experience or expertise (Yin, 1969). As all of the low-level features
of an image are still present after inverting the image, an impaired ability to discriminate
between stimuli when they are inverted compared to when they are upright is thought to
indicate specialized processing of that type of stimulus (Hayden et al, 2007; Pascalis,
Demont, de Haan, & Campbell, 2001; Zieber et al, 2010). Thus, a failure by infants to
exhibit differential looking to between-species category versus within-species category
stimulus contrasts in this experiment would indicate that the category sensitivity
exhibited in Experiment 1 was driven by more than just low-level perceptual information.
Method
Participants. Sixteen 3.5-month-olds (mean age = 103.75 days, SD = 9.21; 9
female) and 16 6.5-month-olds (mean age = 195.00 days, SD = 9.32; 7 female)
successfully completed the study and were included in the final sample. Two additional
3.5-month-olds participated but were excluded for not looking during at least one test
trial (n=1) or sleeping (n=1). Three 6.5-month-olds were excluded for looking for less
than 20% of the study duration. Participants in this study were recruited in the same
manner as in Experiment 1, and they were predominantly from middle-class, Caucasian
families.
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Stimuli, Apparatus, and Procedure. The images used in Experiment 1 were
flipped vertically. No additional changes were made. The same equipment and
procedures were used as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The dependent measure was the proportion of fixation duration to betweenspecies contrast trials. In the case of 3.5-month-olds, a one-sample t-test comparing
proportion fixation duration to the between-species contrast trials (M = 54.58%, SE =
2.01) to chance (50%) found that infants fixated proportionally longer on betweenspecies contrast trials than chance [t(15) = 2.28, p = .038, d = 0.57]. Thus, 3.5-montholds’ performance on inverted stimuli in this experiment was similar to their performance
on upright stimuli in Experiment 1, indicating that their performance was not impacted by
inversion. However, 6.5-month-olds’ proportion of fixation duration to between-species
contrast trials (M = 52.86%, SE = 7.36) did not significantly differ from chance [t(15) =
1.56, p = .140, d = 0.39]. Furthermore, 12 out of 16 3.5-month-old infants proportion
fixation to between-species contrast trials was above chance (binomial p = .040), as
compared to only 8 out of 16 (binomial p = .500) for 6.5-month-old infants. Thus, unlike
3.5-month-olds, 6.5-month-olds’ performance was impaired by stimulus inversion. This
finding indicates that there is a level of expertise impacting 6.5-month-olds’ categorical
perception of cats and dogs. Namely, the fact that infants only show a preference for the
between-species contrast when images are upright, in spite of the fact that all features are
still present in the inverted condition, suggests category knowledge beyond perceptual
features. However, an independent samples t-test indicated no effect of age group [t(30) =
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0.63, p = .533, d=.22]. Thus, caution must be exercised when interpreting a
developmental change.

22

Chapter 4:
General Discussion
In this study, it was found that by 3.5 months of age infants’ representations of cat
and dog categories include a discrete boundary. Infants looked longer at image pairs that
crossed the categorical species boundary than at those that remained within one species
category, in spite of the fact that within-category and between-category similarity was
equated. This replicates the finding that infants can form categories for cats and dogs
(Quinn & Eimas, 1996). Furthermore, this finding extends previous work by
demonstrating that species categories in infancy are discrete, rather than continuous, and
that infants possess these categories without any form of priming or training in the lab.
Finally, by 6.5-months of age the documented discrete category perception of cats and
dogs involves some amount of expertise or specialized processing, as shown by the
disruption in processing caused by inversion in Experiment 2. In contrast, 3.5-month-olds
performed similarly on both upright and inverted images.
This study demonstrates that infants are able to form discrete representations of
biological kinds before acquiring language to label such categories. As the number and
variety of exemplars of cats and dogs 3.5-month-old infants are likely to be exposed to is
very limited, this suggests that little to no experience, and no explicit training, is
necessary to form rigid category structures. Such a propensity to dichotomize early in life
could have implications not only for understanding how infants mentally organize
biological kinds, but also for issues in social development. One example is developing an
understanding of sex categories. Infants as young as 3.5-months of age have been found
to be sensitive to sex information present in faces (Quinn, Yahr, Kuhn, Slater, & Pascalis,

23

2002). It is possible that this early knowledge of sex categories contains a discrete
boundary. Given trends in society to move toward a more continuous representation of
gender, one can imagine that rigid mental representations of sex could become
problematic, given that it is not always correlated with gender.
This work also suggests a developmental change in category knowledge within
the first half of the first year of life. This could be a form of perceptual narrowing driven
by 6.5-month-olds’ increased exposure to animals in their upright orientations. As noted
by Cashon and Cohen (2004), who documented the onset of inversion effects to the
integral processing of faces between 4 and 7 months of age, it is plausible that 3.5-montholds are spending more time in positions that allow them to see faces in varied locations
than 6.5-month-olds (who are possibly sitting or crawling, meaning their exposure to
faces is more often in upright orientations). Another possibility is that the younger infants
do not have enough experience with cats or dogs (regardless of orientation) to develop
specialized processing. It is also conceivable that infants are undergoing a shift in the
content of their categories for cats and dogs between the age groups in this study.
Namely, rather than containing exclusively perceptual information (such as size and
color), 6.5-month-olds category knowledge could include conceptual information (such
as “thing that bites”) that may be more sensitive to disruption by inversion. Regardless of
mechanism, this change highlights the fact that category perception is rapidly changing in
infancy.
A limitation of this study is that we were unable to examine the role of experience
in discrete category formation. While it is likely that every infant in the study was
exposed to cats or dogs in some capacity before participating, regardless of whether they
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live with them, one cannot be sure what role this exposure played in their performance.
As it is difficult to assign participants levels of exposure to cats and dogs in their daily
lives, another avenue for examining the impact of experience is to use novel species
categories that infants are unlikely to have seen. If infants display sensitivity to discrete
category boundaries between species they have no experience with, it would seem that
humans are predisposed to organize the world of biological kinds into discrete categories
with definite boundaries between species.
It is possible that during this study infants were weighing certain features more
than others. For example, if the cat category representation in infancy included a critical
feature such as “short-nose,” the decision regarding the presence or absence of the feature
may be digital. In this example, there could be a sharp break between what would be
considered a “short-nose” indicating cat, and what would be considered a “long-nose,”
indicating dog. Thus, while the morphing procedure used in this study does not
differentially weight features, judgments based on critical features would also yield the
same pattern of results. However, there is evidence to suggest that young children
respond based on overall similarity judgments rather than specific dimensions. For
example, research has indicated that even preschoolers treat separable dimensions, such
as hue and shape, as integral in sorting tasks and perform in ways predominated by total
similarity (Kemler, 1983). Therefore, it is possible that infants respond to the overall
similarity between images rather than the presence or absence of a critical feature.
A note to future researchers wishing to use this procedure is that failure to detect
differences in attention to the between and within-species contrasts in this study need not
necessarily indicate the lack of a discrete categorical boundary. It can only be interpreted
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that there is no such boundary between 40% and 60%. To our knowledge, no research has
investigated the location of the boundary between cats and dogs, so for our purposes we
assumed the boundary was near 50%. If this assumption had been incorrect, we would
not have found an attentional bias to the across species contrasts using these specific
percentages. For example, if there was a discrete boundary exactly at 60% you would not
expect bias toward either condition. Future research with this paradigm should consider
the possibility that all boundaries may not be as centered, as has been found in studies of
emotional expressions in human faces (Fujimura, Matsuda, Katahira, Okada, & Okayona,
2012), and adjust the proportions used accordingly.
It is worth noting that while the question of mental representations of categories
(e.g., whether they involve prototypes or a list of exemplars) is of great interest to
researchers (for review see, Murphy, 2002), it can be separated from the question of
relationships between categories. The current study was concerned with the borders
between categories, not the exact nature of their representations. In other words,
regardless of whether the categories of cat and dog possessed by the infant are
represented by exemplars (multiple specific examples) or prototypes (a summary or
single “best case”), they either have a discrete border between them or they do not. One
way to conceptualize this border is that it is based on dichotomous decisions regarding
category membership based on distance in cognitive space. This applies equally well to
categories represented by prototypes as by exemplars. Thus, the findings of this study are
consistent with either theory of mental representations of categories.
Future research should apply this procedure to socially relevant category
structures. This could lend insights into questions about the categorization of humans as a
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species, or the false dichotomization of racial categories and gender. It will also be
important to examine category structures at subordinate and superordinate levels. Given
the primacy of basic level category perception in adults and children, it is possible that
categories at lower and higher levels dichotomize later in development or are
qualitatively different.
In conclusion, the current findings demonstrate a discrete boundary between the
categories of cat and dog early in infancy. Furthermore, this work extends previous
knowledge of infant categorical perception by demonstrating a priori knowledge of
familiar species categories and the boundaries between them. This knowledge of category
relationships early in life could lead to a greater understanding of the concepts we possess
as adults that allow us to mentally organize and expertly respond to the world around us.
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